We present results from an experiment that randomized the expansion of electric grid infrastructure in rural Kenya. Electricity distribution is a canonical example of a natural monopoly. Randomized price offers show that demand for electricity connections falls sharply with price. Experimental variation in the number of connections, combined with administrative cost data, reveals considerable scale economies, as hypothesized. However, consumer surplus is far less than total construction costs at all price levels. Moreover, we do not find meaningful medium-run impacts on economic, health, and educational outcomes, nor evidence of spillovers to unconnected local households. These results suggest that current efforts to increase residential electrification in rural Kenya may reduce social welfare. We discuss how leakage of funds, reduced demand (due to red tape, low reliability, and credit constraints), and other factors may impact this conclusion.
I. INTRODUCTION
Investments in infrastructure, including transportation, water and sanitation, telecommunications, and electricity systems, are primary targets for international development assistance. In 2015, for example, the World Bank directed a third of its global lending portfolio to infrastructure. 1 The basic economics of these types of investments-which tend to involve high fixed costs, relatively low marginal costs, and long investment horizons-can justify government investment, ownership, and subsequent regulation. While development economists have recently begun to measure the economic impacts of various types of infrastructure, including transportation (Donaldson 2013; Faber 2014) , water and sanitation (Devoto et al. 2012; Patil et al. 2014) , telecommunications (Jensen 2007; Aker 2010) , and electricity systems (Dinkelman 2011; Lipscomb, Mobarak, and Barham 2013; Burlig and Preonas 2016; Chakravorty, Emerick, and Ravago 2016; Barron and Torero 2017) , there remains limited empirical evidence that links the demand-side and supply-side economics of infrastructure investments, in part due to methodological challenges. For instance, in many settings it is not only difficult to identify exogenous sources of variation in the presence of infrastructure, but also difficult to obtain relevant administrative cost data on infrastructure projects.
In this paper, we analyze the economics of rural electrification. We present experimental evidence on both the demand-side and supply-side of electrification, specifically, household connections to the electric grid. We compare demand and cost curves, and evaluate medium-run impacts on a range of economic, health, and educational outcomes to assess the welfare implications of mass rural electrification.
The study setting is 150 rural communities in Kenya, a country where grid coverage is rapidly expanding. In partnership with Kenya's Rural Electrification Authority (REA), we provided randomly selected clusters of households with an opportunity to connect to the grid at subsidized prices. The intervention generated exogenous variation both in the price of a grid connection, and in the scale of each local construction project. As a result, we can estimate the demand curve for grid connections among households and, in a methodological innovation of the current study, the average and marginal cost curves associated with household grid connection 1 In 2014 and 2015, the World Bank allocated nearly 40 percent of total lending towards its Energy and Mining, Transportation, and Water, Sanitation, and Flood Protection sectors (World Bank Annual Report 2015) .
projects of varying sizes. We then exploit the exogenous variation in grid connections induced by the randomized subsidy offers to estimate electrification impacts.
We find that household demand for grid connections is lower than predicted, even at high subsidy rates. For example, lowering the connection price by 57 percent (relative to the prevailing price) increases demand by less than 25 percentage points. The cost of supplying connections, however, is high, even at universal community coverage when the gains from the economies of scale are attained. As a result, the estimated consumer surplus from grid connections is far less than the total connection cost at all coverage levels, amounting to less than one quarter of total costs.
We derive a second measure of the consumer surplus from a grid connection based on the subsequent benefits derived from consuming electricity, and find it similarly falls far below the total connection cost. In addition, we do not find economically meaningful or statistically significant impacts of electrification on a range of economic, health, and educational outcomes in the medium-run (roughly 18 months post-connection), and no evidence of spillover benefits for local households.
This constellation of findings points to a perhaps unexpected conclusion, namely, that investments in rural household electrification may reduce social welfare in our setting. We then consider the external validity of this finding by presenting and discussing empirical evidence on the role of excess costs from leakage during construction, and reduced demand due to bureaucratic red tape, low grid reliability, and credit constraints in our setting.
Electricity systems serve as canonical examples of natural monopolies in microeconomics textbooks. Empirical estimates in the literature date back to Christensen and Greene (1976) , who examine economies of scale in electricity generation. In recent decades, initiatives to restructure electricity markets around the world have been motivated by the view that while economies of scale are limited in generation, the transmission and distribution of electricity continue to exhibit standard characteristics of natural monopolies (Joskow 2000) .
We differentiate between two separate components of electricity distribution. First, there is an access component, which consists of physically extending and connecting households to the grid, and is the subject of this paper. Second, there is a service component, which consists of the ongoing provision of electricity. There is some evidence of economies of scale in both areas.
Engineering studies show how the costs of grid extension may vary depending on settlement patterns (Zvoleff et al. 2009 ) or can be reduced through the application of spatial electricity planning models (Parshall et al. 2009 ). With regards to electricity services, data from municipal utilities has been used to demonstrate increasing returns to scale in maintenance and billing (Yatchew 2000) . While recent papers have examined the demand for rural electrification using both survey (Abdullah and Jeanty 2011) and experimental variation (Bernard and Torero 2015; Barron and Torero 2017) , ours is the first study to our knowledge to combine experimental estimates on the demand for and costs of grid extensions, as well as provide experimental evidence on later impacts for households. By combining these three elements, we contribute to ongoing debates regarding the economics of rural electrification in low-income regions.
In Sub-Saharan Africa, roughly 600 million people currently live without electricity (IEA 2014) , and achieving universal access to modern energy has become a primary goal for policymakers, non-governmental organizations, and international donors. In 2013, the U.S.
launched a multi-billion-dollar aid initiative, Power Africa, with a goal of adding 60 million new connections in Africa. The United Nations Sustainable Development Goals include, "access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all." In Kenya, the government has recently invested heavily in expanding the electric grid to rural areas, and even though the rural household electrification rate remains low, most households are now "under grid," or within connecting distance of a low-voltage line . 2 As a result, the "last-mile" grid connectivity we study has recently emerged as a political priority in Kenya.
At the macroeconomic level, there is a strong correlation between energy consumption and economic development, and it is widely agreed that a well-functioning energy sector is critical for sustained economic growth. There is less evidence, however, on how energy drives poverty reduction, and how investments in industrial energy access compare to the economic impacts of electrifying households. For rural communities, there are also active debates about whether increased energy access should be driven mainly by grid connections or via distributed solutions, such as solar lanterns and solar home systems .
Although we find that the estimated consumer surplus from household grid connections is substantially less than the total connection cost at all coverage levels, universal access to electricity may still conceivably increase social welfare. For example, mass electrification might transform rural life in several ways: with electricity, individuals may be exposed to more media 2 In the 2009 Kenya Population and Housing Census, 5.1 percent of rural households use electricity for lighting.
and information, might participate more actively in public life and generate improvements in the political system or public policy, and children could study more and be more likely to obtain work outside of rural subsistence agriculture later in life. However, roughly 18 months after gaining an electricity connection, households show little evidence of any such gains, or their precursors. For instance, there are no meaningful impacts on objective political knowledge among respondents, nor on child test score performance. Of course, it is possible that the impacts of electrification take longer to materialize. Long-run impact studies will thus be useful to assess whether rural electrification should be a development policy priority in African countries.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II presents several natural monopoly scenarios that are empirically tested; Section III discusses rural electrification in Kenya; Section IV describes the experimental design; Section V presents the main empirical results; Section VI discusses external validity, focusing on institutional and implementation challenges to rural electrification, and their implications; and the final section concludes.
II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
In the classic definition, an industry is a natural monopoly if the production of a particular good or service by a single firm minimizes cost (Viscusi, Vernon, Harrington 2005) .
More advanced treatments elaborate on the concept of subadditive costs, which extend the definition to multiproduct firms (Baumol 1977) . Textbook treatments point out that real world examples involve physical distribution networks, and specifically cite water, telecommunications and electric power (Samuelson and Nordhaus 1998; Carlton and Perloff 2005; Mankiw 2011) .
A. Standard model
We consider the case of an electric utility that provides communities of households with connections to the grid. To supply these connections, the utility incurs a fixed cost to build a low-voltage (LV) trunk network of poles and wires in each community. In the standard model, illustrated in figure 1, panel A, the electricity distribution utility is a natural monopoly facing high fixed costs, constant or declining marginal costs, and a downward-sloping average total cost curve. As coverage increases, the marginal cost of connecting an additional household should decrease, as the distance to the network declines. At high coverage levels, the marginal cost is essentially the cost of a drop-down service cable that connects a household to the LV network.
Household demand for a grid connection reflects expectations about the difference between the consumer surplus from electricity consumption and the price of monthly electricity service.
The social planner's solution is to set the connection price equal to the level where the demand curve intersects the marginal cost curve (p′ in the figure) . Due to the natural monopoly characteristics of the industry, the utility is unable to cover its costs at this price, and the social planner must subsidize the electric utility to make up the difference. In panel A, total consumer surplus from the electricity distribution system is positive at price p′ since the area under the demand curve is greater than the total cost, represented by rectangle with height c′ and width d′.
Note that we are assuming that, once connected, a household can purchase electricity at the social marginal cost. If this is true, there are no further social gains or losses from electricity
consumption. An alternative approach to estimating the social surplus from a connection is to calculate the surplus from consuming electricity over the life of the connection. We implement this approach empirically in Section V.E.
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B. Alternative scenarios and potential externalities from grid connections
We illustrate an alternative scenario in figure 1, panel B. Here, the natural monopolist faces higher fixed costs. In this case, consumer surplus (the area underneath D) is less than total cost at all quantities, and a subsidized electrification program reduces social welfare.
In panel C, we maintain the same demand and cost curves as in panel B, but illustrate a case in which the social demand curve (D′) lies above observed private demand (D). There may be positive externalities (spillovers) from private grid connections, especially in communities with strong social ties, where connected households share the benefits of power with neighbors.
In rural Kenya, for instance, people may spend some time in the homes of neighbors who have electricity, watching TV, charging mobile phones, and enjoying better quality lighting in the evening. Another factor that could contribute to a gap between D and D′ is the possibility that households have higher inter-temporal discount rates than policymakers. For example, if electrification allows children to study more and increases future earnings, there may be a gap if parents discount their children's future earnings more than the social planner. Further, observed private demand may be low due to market failures, such as credit constraints or a lack of information about the long-run private benefits of a connection; what we are calling the social demand curve would also reflect the willingness to pay for grid connections if these issues were 3 Appendix A includes a more detailed discussion of the underlying theoretical framework.
resolved. In general, if D′ lies above D, there may be a price at which the consumer surplus (the area underneath D′) exceeds total costs. In the scenario depicted in panel C, D′ is sufficiently high, and the ideal outcome is to offer full community coverage at price p′′′ and a subsidy equal to the rectangle with height c′′′ -p′′′ and width d′′′ provided to the utility.
Which of these cases best fits the data? In this paper, we trace out the natural monopoly cost curves using experimental variation in the connection price and in the scale of each local construction project. The estimated curves correspond to the segments of figure 1 that range between the pre-existing rural household electrification rate level, which is roughly 5 percent at baseline in our data, and full community coverage (d=1). This is the policy relevant range for governments considering subsidized mass rural connection programs in communities where they have already installed distribution transformers.
One type of externality that we do not consider is the negative spillover from greater energy consumption, due to higher CO 2 emissions and other forms of environmental pollution.
These would shift the total social cost curve up, making mass electrification less desirable. In the next section, we discuss aspects of electricity generation in Kenya that make these issues less of a concern in the study setting than they often are elsewhere.
III. RURAL ELECTRIFICATION IN KENYA
Kenya has a relatively "green" electricity grid, with most energy generated through hydropower and geothermal plants, and with fossil fuels representing just one third of total installed electricity generation capacity, which totaled 2,295 megawatts as of 2015. Installed capacity is projected to increase tenfold by the year 2031, with the proportion of electricity generated using fossil fuels remaining roughly the same over time. 4 Thus Kenya appears poised to substantially increase rural energy access by relying largely on non-fossil fuel energy sources.
In recent years, there has been a dramatic increase in the coverage of the electric grid. For instance, in 2003, a mere 285 public secondary schools (3 percent of the total) across the country had electricity connections, while by November 2012, Kenyan newspapers projected that 100 percent of the country's 8,436 secondary schools would soon be connected. The driving force 4 Specifically, in 2015, total installed capacity consisted primarily of hydro (36 percent), fossil fuels (35 percent), and geothermal (26 percent) sources. Based on government planning reports (referred to as Vision 2030), total installed capacity is expected to reach 21,620 MW by 2031, with fossil fuels (e.g., diesel and natural gas) representing 32 percent of the total. Many other African countries generate similar shares of electricity from nonfossil fuel sources communities to conduct a census of the universe of households within 600 m of the central transformer. This database, consisting of 12,001 unconnected households in total, served as the study sampling frame, and showed that 94.5 percent of households remained unconnected despite being "under grid" ).
Although population density in our setting is fairly high, the average minimum distance between structures is 52.8 meters. 8 These distances make illegal connections quite costly, since local pole infrastructure would be required to "tap" into nearby lines; in practice, the number of 7 See appendix A for further details and appendix figure B1 for a map of the sample communities. 8 In appendix figure B2 , we present a map of a typical (in terms of residential density) transformer community, illustrating the degree to which unconnected households are within close proximity of an LV line.
illegal connections is negligible in the study sample (unlike in some urban areas in Kenya, where they are anecdotally more common).
For each unconnected household, we calculated the shortest (straight-line) distance to an LV line, approximated by either the transformer or a connected structure. To limit construction costs, REA requested that we limit the sampling frame to the 84.9 percent of households located within 600 meters of a transformer that were also no more than 400 meters away from a lowvoltage line. 9 Applying this threshold, we randomly selected 2,289 "under grid" households, or roughly 15 households per community.
B. Experimental design and implementation
Between February and August 2014, a baseline survey was administered to the 2,289 study households. We additionally collected baseline data for 215 already connected households, or 30.5 percent of the universe of households observed to be connected to the grid at the time of the census, sampling up to four connected households in each community, wherever possible. Treatment households also received an opportunity to install a basic, certified household wiring solution (a "ready-board") in their homes at no additional cost. Each ready-board-valued at roughly $34 per unit-featured a single light bulb socket, two power outlets, and two miniature circuit breakers. 13 Each connected household was fitted with a prepaid electricity meter at no additional charge. At the end of the eight-week period, treatment households could once again connect to the grid at the standard connection price of $398.
After verifying payments, we provided REA with a list of households to be connected.
This initiated a lengthy process to complete the design, contracting, construction, and metering of grid connections: the first household was metered in September 2014, the average connection time was seven months, and the final household was metered over a year later, in October 2015.
Additional details are discussed in Section VI.B below.
Between May and September 2016, we administered an endline survey to 2,217 study households, or 96.9 percent of the baseline sample. We surveyed an additional 1,345
households-or between six to eleven households per community-as part of a "spillover sample," randomly sampling households that were observed to be unconnected at the time of the census but were not chosen for the baseline survey. Data from this spillover sample is used to study within-village external impacts. We also collected endline data from 208 of the 215 households that had already been connected at the time of the baseline census. As part of the endline survey, we additionally administered short English and Math tests to all 12 to 15-year olds in the endline sample households, or 2,317 children in total.
Following Casey, Glennerster, and Miguel (2012), we registered two pre-analysis plans;
these are available at http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/350 and in appendix C. Pre-Analysis Plan A specifies the analyses of the demand and cost data, and Pre-Analysis Plan B specifies the analyses of electrification impacts in the endline survey data.
C. Data
The analysis combines a variety of survey, experimental, and administrative data, collected and compiled between August 2013 and December 2016. The datasets include:
community characteristics data (N=150); baseline household survey data (N=2,504); experimental demand data (N=2,289); administrative community construction cost data (N=77); endline household survey data (N=3,770); and children's test score data (N=2,310). We test for balance across treatment arms by regressing household and community characteristics on indicators for the three subsidy levels, and conduct F-tests that all treatment coefficients equal to zero. For the 23 household-level and two community-level variables analyzed, F-statistics are significant at 5 percent for only two variables, namely, a binary variable indicating whether the respondent could correctly identify the presidents of Tanzania, Uganda, and the United States (a measure of political awareness) and monthly (non-charcoal) energy spending, indicating that the randomization created largely comparable groups.
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D. Baseline characteristics
V. RESULTS
A. Estimating the demand for electricity connections
In figure 2, we plot the experimental results on the demand for grid connections. Take-up of a free grid connection offer is nearly universal, but demand falls sharply with price, and is close to zero among the low subsidy treatment group, as well as in the control (no subsidy)
group. Panel A presents the experimental results and compares them to the government's "prior" on demand, namely, the Ministry of Energy and Petroleum's internal predictions for take-up in rural areas. The government demand curve-which we learned of in early-2015 via a government report-was developed independently of our project and served as justification for the planned LMCP price of $171 (15,000 KES). A key finding is that, even at generous subsidy levels, actual take-up is significantly lower than predicted by the government (or by our team, see appendix figure B8 ). 17 In panels B and C, we show that households with high-quality walls and greater earnings in the last month, respectively, had higher take-up rates in the medium and low subsidy arms, suggesting that demand increases at higher incomes. 16 In June 2014, the standard electricity tariff for small households was roughly 2.8 cents per kWh. As a point of comparison, taking into consideration fixed charges and other adjustments, $5.55 translates into roughly 30 kWh of electricity consumption, which is enough for basic lighting, television, and fan appliances each day of the month. 17 The government report projected take-up in rural areas nationally, rather than in our study region alone, and this is one possible source of the discrepancy. Moreover, the government report does not clearly specify the timeframe over which households would be asked to raise funds for a connection, somewhat complicating the comparison.
If we extrapolate the [1.3, 7.1] segment of the demand curve through the intercept, the area under the demand curve is just $12,421. 18 Based on average community density of 84.7
households, this implies an average valuation of just $147 per household.
We estimate the following regression equation:
where is an indicator variable reflecting the take-up decision for household i in transformer community c. The binary variables , , and indicate whether community c was randomly assigned into the low, medium, or high subsidy arm, respectively, and the coefficients 1 , 2 , and 3 capture the subsidy impacts on take-up. 19 Following Bruhn and McKenzie (2009) , we include a vector of community-level characteristics, , containing variables used for stratification during randomization (see Section IV.B). In addition, we include a vector of baseline household-level characteristics, , containing pre-specified covariates that may also predict take-up (including household size, the number of chickens owned, respondent age, highquality walls, and whether the respondent attended secondary school, is not a farmer, uses a bank account, engages in business or self-employment, and is a senior citizen). Standard errors are clustered by community, the unit of randomization. Table 2 summarizes the results of estimating equation 1, where column 1 reports estimates from a model that includes only the treatment indicators, and column 2 includes the household and community controls. All three subsidy levels lead to significant increases in takeup: the 100 percent subsidy increases the likelihood of take-up by roughly 95 percentage points, and the effects of the partial 57 and 29 percent subsidies are much smaller, at 23 and 6
percentage points, respectively. Columns 3 to 8 include interactions between the treatment indicators and correlates of household economic status, as well as community variables, which are listed in the column headings. Take-up in treatment communities is differentially higher in the low and medium subsidy arms for households with wealthier and more educated respondents;
for instance, the coefficient on the interaction between attended secondary school and the medium subsidy indicator is 19.5 percent.
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Based on the findings in Bernard and Torero (2015) , one might expect take-up to be higher in areas where grid connections are more prevalent if, as they argue, exposure to households with electricity leads individuals to better understand its benefits and value it more.
Yet when we include an interaction with the baseline community electrification rate in column 6, or an interaction with the proportion of neighboring households within 200 meters connected to electricity at baseline (column 7), we find no meaningful interaction effects.
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B. Estimating the economies of scale in electricity grid extension
An immediate consequence of the downward-sloping demand curve estimated above is that the randomized price offers generate exogenous variation in the proportion of households in a community that are connected as part of the same local construction project. This novel design feature allows us to experimentally assess the economies of scale in grid extension. As hypothesized, we find considerable scale economies. In addition, we find no evidence of endogeneity as OLS and IV estimates of the effect of scale (e.g., the number of connections) on the average total cost per connection ("ATC") are no different.
In the Kenya Power administrative data across all projects in the sample, the actual ATC is $1,813. While this seems high, it is in line with several alternative estimates, including: (1) Kenya Power's public estimate of $1,435 per rural connection; (2) the Ministry of Energy and Petroleum's estimate of $1,602; and (3) a consultant's estimated range of $1,322 to $1,601 in urban and rural areas, respectively (Korn 2014). 22 In figure 3 , we plot the fitted curve (light-grey curve) from a regression estimating the ATC as a quadratic function of community coverage, (where coverage takes on values from 0 20 In appendix table B3, we compare the characteristics of households choosing to take up electricity across treatment arms. Households that paid more for an electricity connection (i.e., the low subsidy arm) are wealthier on average than those who paid nothing (high subsidy), i.e., they are better educated, more likely to have bank accounts, live in larger households with high-quality walls, spend more on energy, and have more assets. In appendix tables B4A to B4E, we report all related regressions specified in Pre-Analysis Plan A, for completeness. 21 Of course, this does not rule out the possibility of a differential effect at higher levels of electrification, since baseline household electrification rates are generally low in our sample of communities (the interquartile range is 1.8 to 7.8 percent). Also, since community-level characteristics, such as income, are likely positively correlated across households, the lack of statistically significant coefficients may reflect the offsetting joint impacts of negative takeup spillovers and positively correlated take-up decisions; future research could usefully explore these issues. 22 Elsewhere, rural grid connection costs have been observed to be similar, ranging from $1,100 per connection in Vietnam to $2,300 per connection in Tanzania (Castellano et al. 2015) .
to 100). 23 The quadratic function does not provide a good fit to the data: it predicts considerably lower costs at intermediate coverage levels while greatly overstating them at universal coverage. 24 Instead, we focus on an alternative functional form for ATC featuring a communitywide fixed cost and linear marginal costs:
The nonlinear estimation of equation 2 yields coefficient estimates (and standard errors) of 0 = 2287.8 (s.e. 322.8) for the fixed cost, 1 = 1244.3 (s.e. 159.0), and 2 = -6.1 (s.e. 3.4). We plot the predicted values from this nonlinear estimation in figure 3 (dark-grey curve). 25 We then take the derivative of the total cost function (which is obtained by multiplying equation 2 by ) to estimate the linear marginal cost function:
While this choice of functional form differs from our pre-specified regression model, we believe that imposing linear marginal costs is both economically intuitive (e.g., as coverage increases, the marginal cost of connecting an additional household decreases) and closely matches the observed data. Regardless of the exact functional form, though, average costs decline in the number of households connected, as in the textbook natural monopoly case.
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While there are strong initial economies of scale, we also document that the incremental cost savings appear to decline at higher levels of community coverage, and the estimates imply an average cost of approximately $658 per connection at universal coverage ( = 100).
23 Note that in Figure 3 , we plot fitted curves by combining two sets of cost data. First, for each community in which the project delivered an electricity connection (n=62), we received budgeted costs for the number of poles and service lines, length of LV lines, and design, labor and transportation costs. We refer to these as "sample" data. Second, REA provided us with budgeted costs for higher levels of coverage (i.e., at 60, 80, and 100 percent of the community connected) for a subset of the high subsidy arm communities (n=15). We refer to these as "designed" data. It is important to note that REA followed the same costing methodology for both sets of cost data (e.g., the same personnel visited the field sites to design the LV network and estimate the costs). This ensured comparability between budgeted estimates for sample and designed communities. Combining the two sets of cost data (N=77) enables us to trace out the ATC at all coverage levels. See appendix A for a discussion of the regressions in which we estimate the impact of either the number of connections or community coverage on the ATC. 24 Despite this poor fit, we include this result because it was specified in our pre-analysis plan. In retrospect, it was an oversight on our part to fail to include the standard fixed cost at the community level in the model. 25 Appendix table B5A reports actual and predicted ATC values at various coverage levels. 26 In appendix figure B9A , we compare the predicted curve from nonlinear estimation using only sample community data (N=62) against the predicted curve using both sample and designed community data (N=77). In appendix figure  B9B , we compare alternative functional forms for costs, and the same conclusions hold across cases.
In communities with larger populations, the higher density of households may potentially translate into a larger impact of scale on ATC. In appendix table B5B, column 2, we report the results of regressions in which we estimate the impact of project scale (i.e., the number of connections, , and a quadratic term, 2 ) on ATC, including interactions between community population and both and 2 . While there are no significant effects in the range of densities observed in our sample, it seems plausible that per household connection costs could be higher in other parts of rural Kenya with far lower rates of residential density. There is also no evidence that higher average land gradient is associated with higher ATC.
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C. Experimental approach to estimating net welfare
In figure 4 , we compare the experimental demand curve with the average and marginal cost curves (panel A), and then estimate total cost and consumer surplus at full coverage (panel B). We first focus on the revealed preference demand estimates, and discuss issues of credit constraints and informational asymmetries below in Section VI.B.
The main observation is that the estimated demand curve for an electricity connection does not intersect the estimated marginal cost curve. To illustrate, at 100 percent coverage, we estimate the total cost of connecting a community to be $55,713 based on the mean community density of 84.7 households. In contrast, as noted in Section V.A, consumer surplus at this coverage level is far less, at only $12,421, or less than one quarter the costs. The consumer surplus is substantially smaller than total connection costs at all quantity levels, suggesting that rural household electrification may reduce social welfare. This result is robust to considering the uncertainty in the demand and cost estimates (see appendix figure B9C ).
Specifically, our calculations suggest that a mass electrification program would result in a welfare loss of $43,292 per community. 28 To justify such a program, discounted future social 27 Based on Dinkelman (2011), we expect land gradient to be positively correlated with ATC, but in our setting, the correlation is, if anything, negative. While the result is counterintuitive, note that there is little variation in average land gradient in our sample, which ranges from 0.79 to 7.76 degrees. While land gradient may be an important predictor of the costs of extending high-voltage lines in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa, as in Dinkelman (2011) , our data suggest that it is less important in predicting construction costs across smaller areas; see appendix figure B10 . 28 To calculate consumer surplus, we estimate the area under the unobserved [0, 1.3] domain by projecting the slope of the demand curve in the range [1.3, 7.1] through the intercept. The 1.3 percent figure is the proportion of the control group that chose to connect to the grid during the study period, which, for comparability to other points on the demand curve, we assume would happen over the same eight-week period as our offer. If anything, this assumption yields higher consumer surplus than alternative, perhaps more reasonable, assumptions on timing. Appendix figure B11 considers the sensitivity of our results on welfare loss to alternative demand curve welfare gains of $511 would be required for each household in the community, above and beyond any economic or other benefits already considered by households in their own private take-up decisions. These welfare gains could take several possible forms, including spillovers in consumption or broader economic production, an issue we explore below. Credit constraints or imperfect household information about the long-run benefits of electrification may both also contribute to lower demand, issues we turn to in the next section, while negative pollution externalities could raise the social costs of grid connections.
In an alternative scenario, illustrated in appendix figure B12 , we estimate the demand for and costs of a program structured like the LMCP, which planned to offer a connection price of $171. In this case, only 23.7 percent of households would take-up based on the experimental estimates, and thus unless the government were willing to provide additional subsidies or financing, the resulting electrification level would be low. At 23.7 percent coverage, there is an analogous welfare loss of $22,100 per community, or $1,099 per connected household.
D. Economic impacts of rural electrification
Much of the recent literature on the microeconomics of electrification focuses on estimating the impacts of increasing access to electricity for rural households and communities.
However, there is substantial variation in the types of outcomes examined, as well as the magnitudes of impacts estimated. 29 Furthermore, non-experimental studies typically face challenges in identifying credible exogenous sources of variation in electrification status. In contrast, we exploit experimental variation in grid electrification to test the hypothesis that households connected to the electricity grid enjoy improved living standards and impacts on other life outcomes in the medium-run, roughly 18 months post-connection.
We limit our discussion here to a set of ten pre-specified "primary" outcomes that are meant to capture several important dimensions of overall living standards in the study setting.
The primary outcomes of interest include: household electrification status (denoted outcome P1); grid electricity spending in the past month (P2); the proportion of household members that are employed or running their own businesses (P3); total hours worked in the past week (P4); total assumptions. In panel C of that figure, the most conservative case, demand is a step function and intersects the vertical axis at $3,000. The welfare loss is still $32,517 per community in this case. 29 For example, some studies find that access to electricity increases measures of rural living standards such as income and consumption (Khandker, Barnes, and Samad 2012; Khandker et al. 2014; van de Walle et al. 2015; Chakravorty, Emerick, and Ravago 2016) , while others find no evidence of impacts on labor markets outcomes, assets, or housing characteristics (Burlig and Preonas 2016) ; see Lee, Miguel and Wolfram (2017) Due to the relatively low take-up rates in the low and medium subsidy groups, we first limit the sample to include only a comparison between the high subsidy group and the control group and estimate intention-to-treat (ITT) specifications. In table 3, column 2, we report the results of estimating the following regression for each of the 10 primary outcomes:
where represents the primary outcome of interest for household i in community c and is a binary variable indicating whether community c was randomly assigned into the high-value subsidy treatment. As in equation 1, we include a vector of community-level characteristics, , as well as a vector of pre-specified, household-level characteristics, 1 , and standard errors are clustered at the community-level.
We then estimate treatment-on-treated (TOT) results using data from all three of the subsidy treatment groups. In table 3, column 3, we report the results of estimating the following equation for each of the primary outcomes:
where , is a binary variable reflecting household i's electrification status. We instrument for E ic with the three indicator variables indicating whether community c was randomly assigned to the low, medium, or high subsidy group.
Column 4 then reports the false discovery rate (FDR)-adjusted q-values corresponding to the coefficient estimates in column 3, which limit the expected proportion of rejections within a hypothesis that are Type I errors (i.e., false positives).
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Perhaps surprisingly, but consistent with the results in Section V.B, we do not find evidence of substantial economic or other impacts stemming from household electrification.
There are no detectable effects on consumption levels, asset ownership, reported health outcomes, or child test score performance. Although there are small, marginally statistically significant impacts on total hours worked (P5) and life satisfaction (P8), these effects do not survive the FDR multiple testing adjustment. Simply put, we detect few changes in rural Kenyan households connected to electricity in the medium-run.
These effects are summarized in panel B of table 3, which combines the four primary economic outcomes (P3-P6) into a mean effect Economic Index, and combines the four primary non-economic outcomes (P7-P10) into a mean effect Non-Economic Index. 31 The average economic effect is small at 0.03 (in standard deviation units), and reasonably precisely estimated (s.e. 0.08), and the average effect on the non-economic variables is also small at -0.02 (in standard deviation units, with s.e. 0.07).
Energy consumption increases in the newly connected households, but overall consumption levels are quite low. The treatment effect on monthly electricity spending is $2.00
to $2.20, a miniscule amount corresponding to electricity consumption of roughly 3 kWh per month. The data indicate that treated household acquired few additional appliances, providing an explanation for the overall lack of positive impacts. For example, in the ITT regression of the number of appliances owned on the high subsidy indicator, the treatment effect is just 0.2; while significant at 95 percent confidence, this effect size represents a small increase over the control mean of 1.8 appliances owned.
Moreover, as shown in appendix table B6, there is no evidence of any meaningful or statistically significant spillover impacts to local households across the ten primary outcomes.
E. Alternative approach to estimating consumer surplus
Alternatively, we can estimate consumer surplus from grid connections using an application of Dubin and McFadden's (1984) discrete-continuous model, similar to Barreca et al. (2016) and Davis and Killian (2011) . This approach then allows us to simulate consumer surplus for different cases regarding both baseline consumption levels and long-run consumption growth, under certain functional form assumptions on the consumer demand curve.
Households are assumed to make a joint decision to acquire a grid connection and consume electricity, and consumer surplus from the connection is then measured as the discounted sum of surplus from consuming electricity over the life of the connection. We assume zero consumer surplus from electricity without a grid connection. 32 Consumer surplus measures depend on the level of monthly electricity consumption, the demand elasticity for electricity (i.e., the slope of the demand curve), the functional form of the demand curve, the long-run cost of supplying electricity, and the intertemporal discount rate. This study's experimental variation in grid connection allows us to measure the shift in the demand curve for electricity directly based on connected households' consumption levels.
Lacking demand elasticity estimates in Kenya, we use U.S. estimates as a lower bound (e.g., Ito 2014), and report consumer surplus under a range of plausible assumptions. We assume linear demand (following Barreca et al. 2016 and Davis and Killian 2011) , a price equal to the constant long-run cost of electricity of $0.12 per kWh, and an annualized 15 percent discount rate. Table 4 reports calculated consumer surplus across a range of demand elasticity and consumption cases. In the study sample, the median monthly electricity consumption level for newly connected households is just 3.6 kWh, an extremely small amount, as noted above. At 5 kWh per month (column 1), consumer surplus ranges from $49 to $147 (depending on demand assumptions), and thus falls well below the average connection cost in the experiment, which is in the range of $1,200 to $1,800. 33 This result holds even if we assume that energy consumption grows at a rapid 10 percent per year (see column 2); in this case consumer surplus ranges from $110 to $329. Column 3 reports estimates at 40 kWh per month, the median consumption level reported by connected households in our sample at baseline. As further validation of this approach, consumer surplus at low demand elasticities exceeds $400 (the private cost of a grid connection). However, it remains below the average connection cost in the experiment.
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In contrast, administrative data from Kenya Power indicates that the median connected household in Nairobi consumes 72.8 kWh per month. 35 At roughly this level of consumption (75 kWh per month, column 4), the rural connections would appear to potentially yield positive social welfare, with consumer surplus ranging from $733 to $2,200. 32 Note that this will, if anything, lead us to overestimate the consumer surplus from acquiring a grid connection since a subset of sample households receive electricity from solar home systems or car batteries. 33 Note that consumer surplus at the lowest demand elasticity is the same as the average valuation obtained in the experiment, even though we arrive at these figures using two distinct methodologies. 34 Furthermore, a full accounting of net welfare for the fraction of households that were initially connected to the grid should include the costs of the transformer and medium-voltage network extensions. Including these would greatly increase the overall costs of rural electrification. 35 In appendix table B7, we present various benchmarks for monthly electricity consumption throughout Kenya. In this section, we consider factors that could drive down costs or drive up demand in our setting, affecting the external validity of our results. Specifically, we present evidence on the role of excess construction costs from leakage, and reduced demand due to bureaucratic red tape, low grid reliability, credit constraints, and possibly unaccounted for spillovers.
VI. EXTERNAL VALIDITY
A. Excess costs from leakage
In appendix table B8, we report the breakdown of budgeted versus invoiced electrification costs per community. The budgeted (ex-ante) costs for each project are based on LV network drawings prepared by REA engineers. 36 The invoiced (ex-post) costs are based on actual final invoices submitted by local contractors, detailing the contractor components of the labor, transport, and materials that were required to complete each project. In total, it cost $585,999 to build 101.6 kilometers of LV lines to connect 478 households through the project.
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Overall, budgeted and invoiced costs per connection were nearly identical, amounting to $1,201 and $1,226, respectively. In other words, contractors submitted invoices that were only 36 An example of an LV network drawing is provided in appendix figure B13 . 37 See appendix A for additional details.
1.7 percent higher than the budgeted amount on average. 38 These cost figures reflect the reality of grid extension in rural Kenya. However, it is possible that they are higher than would ideally be the case due to leakage and other inefficiencies that are common in low-income countries (Reinikka and Svenson 2004) . In our context, it is possible that leakage occurred during the contracting work, in the form of over-reporting labor and transport, which may be hard to verify, and sub-standard construction quality (e.g., using fewer materials than required).
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To measure leakage, we sent teams of enumerators to each treatment community to count the number of electricity poles that were installed, and then compared the actual number of poles to the poles included in the project designs and contractor invoices. While there is minimal variation between ex-ante and ex-post total costs, most contractors' projects showed large differences in the number of observed versus budgeted poles with nearly all using fewer poles:
the number of observed poles was 21.3 percent less than budgeted, a substantial discrepancy.
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Labor and transport costs may also reflect leakage. Labor is typically invoiced based on the number of declared poles, and we showed above that those were inflated. Similarly, transport is invoiced based on the declared mileage of vehicles carrying construction materials. In appendix table B9 , we analyze three highly detailed contractor invoices (for nine communities) that were made available to us. These data contain evidence of over-reported labor costs associated with the electricity poles, at 11.0 percent higher costs than expected, and overreported transport costs: based on a comparison between the reported mileage and the travel routes between the REA warehouse and project sites (suggested by Google Maps), invoiced travel costs were 32.9 percent higher than expected.
Taken together, these findings indicate that electric grid construction costs may be substantially inflated due to mismanagement and corruption in Kenya, suggesting that improved 38 The similarity between planned and actual costs provides further confidence that the connection costs for the designed communities at higher coverage levels (see figure 4 ) are likely to be reasonably accurate. 39 There is evidence of reallocations across the sub-categories in appendix table B8, despite the similarities between ex ante and ex post totals. Invoiced labor and transport costs, for example, were 12.7 percent higher in fact than expected in the plans, while invoiced local network costs were 6.5 percent lower. 40 In appendix figure B14 , we plot the discrepancies between costs and poles by contractor. In addition to being associated with missing public resources, if the planned number of poles reflects accepted engineering standards (i.e., poles are roughly 50 meters apart, etc.), using fewer poles might lead to substandard service quality and even safety risks. For instance, local households may face greater injury risk due to sagging power lines between poles that are spaced too far apart, and the poles may be at greater risk of falling over. It is possible, however, that REA's designs included extra poles, perhaps anticipating that contractors would not use them all.
contractor performance could reduce costs and possibly improve project quality and safety. 41 On the other hand, note that even with a 20 to 30 percent reduction in construction costs, mass rural household electrification would still lead to a reduction in overall social welfare based on the demand and cost estimates in figure 4 , as well as the consumer surplus results in table 4 below.
B. Factors contributing to lower demand for electricity connections
We next discuss several factors that potentially contribute to lower levels of observed household demand for electricity connections, including bureaucratic red tape, low grid reliability, credit constraints, and unaccounted for positive spillovers.
Low levels of demand may be partly attributable to the lengthy and bureaucratic process of obtaining an electricity connection. In our sample, households waited a staggering 188 days after submitting their paperwork before they began receiving electricity. The delays were mainly caused by time lags in project design and contracting, as well as in the installation of meters.
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The World Bank similarly estimates that in practice it takes roughly 110 days to connect new business customers in Kenya (World Bank 2016).
Another major concern is the reliability of power. Electricity shortages and other forms of low grid reliability are well documented in less developed countries (Steinbuks and Foster 2010; Allcott, Collard-Wexler, and O'Connell 2016) . In rural Kenya, households experience both short-term blackouts, which last for a few minutes up to several hours, and long-term blackouts, which can last for months and typically stem from technical problems with local transformers.
The value a household places on an electric grid connection could be substantially lower when service is this unreliable.
During the 14-month period from September 2014 to October 2015 when households were being connected to the grid, we documented the frequency, duration, and primary reason for the long-term blackouts impacting sample communities. In total, 29 out of 150 transformers (19 percent) experienced at least one long-term blackout. On average, these blackouts lasted four months, with the longest lasting an entire year. During these periods, households and businesses did not receive any grid electricity. The most common reasons included transformer burnouts, 41 To the extent costs are high because contractors are over-billing the government, leakage may simply result in a transfer across Kenyan citizens and not a social welfare loss. The social welfare implications would depend on the relative weight the social planner places on contractors, taxpayers, and rural households. 42 Field enumerators report that the electricity connection work may have sometimes been delayed due to expectations that bribes would be paid. Low demand may also be driven in part by household credit constraints, which are well documented in developing countries (De Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff 2009; Karlan et al. 2014 ). In our context, concerns about the role of credit constraints may be exacerbated by the fact that we study a short-run subsidy offer for an electricity connection, redeemable over eight weeks, rather than a permanent change in the connection price across villages (which would provide households with more time to raise the necessary funds); long-term differential prices across villages were not politically feasible in the study setting.
In figure 5 , we compare the experimental results to two sets of stated willingness to pay (WTP) results obtained in the baseline survey to shed some light on this issue. Stated WTP may better capture household valuation in the presence of credit constraints, although this is debatable, since they may also systematically overstate actual demand due to wishful thinking or social desirability bias (Hausman 2012) .
Respondents were first asked whether they would accept a randomly assigned, hypothetical price ranging from $0 to $853 for a grid connection. 45 Households were then asked whether they would accept the hypothetical offer if required to complete the payment in six weeks, a period chosen to be similar to the eight-week payment period in the experiment. We plot results in figure 5 , where the first curve (long-dashed line, black squares) plots the results of the initial question, and the second curve (long-dashed line, grey squares) the follow-up question.
Stated demand is generally high. 46 However, the demand curve falls dramatically when households are faced with a hypothetical time constraint, suggesting they are unable to pay (or 43 In appendix table B10, we provide a list of all the communities that experienced long-term blackouts. 44 Based on personal communications with Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) in December 2015. 45 Each of $114, $171, $227, $284, and $398 had a 16.7 percent chance of being drawn. Each of $0 and $853 had an 8.3 percent chance of being drawn. Nine households are excluded due to errors in administering the question. 46 For more details on the stated demand for electricity connections, see appendix table B11A, where we estimate the impact of the randomized offers on hypothetical and actual take-up, and appendix table B11B, which includes interactions between indicators for the hypothetical offers and key household covariates. In appendix figure B15 , we plot hypothetical demand curves for households with and without bank accounts and high-quality walls.
borrow) the required funds on relatively short notice, an indication that credit constraints may be
binding. An alternative interpretation is that the hypothetical question without time constraints generates exaggerated demand figures. At a price of $171, for example, stated demand is initially 57.6 percent but it drops to 27.2 percent with the time constraint.
Although the experimental demand curve is substantially lower than the stated demand without time limits, it more closely tracks the constrained stated demand: at $171, actual take-up in the experiment is 23.7 percent. The difference between the two contingent valuation results is consistent with the evidence on hypothetical bias (Murphy et al. 2005; Hausman 2012 ).
However, the similarity between the constrained stated demand and experimental results suggest that augmenting survey questions to incorporate realistic timeframes and other contextual factors could help to elicit responses that more closely resemble revealed preference behavior.
We also regressed a binary variable indicating whether a household first accepted the hypothetical offer without the time constraint, but then declined the offer with the time constraint on a set of household covariates. Households with low-quality walls and respondents with no bank accounts are the most likely to switch their stated demand decision when faced with a pressing time constraint, consistent with the likely importance of credit constraints for these groups (see appendix table B11C).
In Section V.C above, we combined the experimental demand and cost curves and show that rural electrification may reduce social welfare. The stated preference results indicate that this outcome is likely to hold even if credit constraints were eased. For example, if we combine the cost curve with the stated demand for grid connections without time constraints, then households in the unobserved [0, 16.7] domain of the stated demand curve (i.e., those willing to pay at least $853) must be willing to pay $2,920 on average for consumer surplus to be larger than total construction costs. While this cannot be ruled out, it appears unlikely in a rural setting where annual per capita income is below $1,000 for most households.
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Furthermore, the ITT results in table 3, column 2 imply that medium-run impacts of electrification on economic (and other) outcomes are close to zero even when credit constraints are eliminated-by the high subsidy offer, which pushed the connection price to zero-providing further evidence that consumer surplus from grid connections is likely to be relatively low.
Another way to address credit constraints is to offer financing plans for grid connections.
In a second set of baseline stated WTP questions, each household was randomly assigned a hypothetical credit offer consisting of an upfront payment (ranging from $39.80 to $127.93), a monthly payment (from $11.84 to $17.22), and a contract length (either 24 or 36 months); we present the results in figure 5 . 48 Households were first asked whether they would accept the offer (short-dashed line, black circles) and then whether they would accept the offer if required to complete the upfront payment in six weeks (grey circles). We then plot take-up against the net present value of the credit offers based on an annualized 15 percent discount rate.
When households are offered financing, stated demand is not only high but also appears likely to be exaggerated, particularly when there are no time constraints to complete the upfront Figure 5 combines the four stated demand curves with the experimental demand and ATC curves. Visually, the only demand curves that appear to yield consumer surpluses that are potentially larger than total construction costs are the stated demand curves for grid connections with credit offers, which as we point out above, could be overstated.
Finally, low demand may indicate that even with subsidies, grid connections are simply too expensive for many of the households in our poor rural setting. After the experiment, we asked households that were connected in the low and medium subsidy arms to name any sacrifices they had made to complete their payments: 29 percent of households stated that they had forgone purchases of basic household consumption goods, and 19 percent stated that they 48 Results for a range of discount rates and net present values are presented in appendix table B12.
had not paid school fees. It seems likely that many households declined the subsidized offer due to binding budget constraints, in other words, poverty, rather than credit constraints alone.
C. Is rural electrification a socially desirable policy?
The leading interpretation of our empirical findings is that mass rural household electrification does not improve social welfare in Kenya, according to standard criteria. The cost of electrifying households appears to be at least four times higher than what households are willing and able to pay for these connections, and consumer surplus appears lower than total costs even with demand estimates that attempt to address credit constraints, or utilize subsequent electricity consumption patterns among connected households. While per household costs fall sharply with coverage, reflecting the economies of scale in the creation of local grid infrastructure, they remain far higher than demand, implying that social welfare falls with each additional subsidized connection. These results are also consistent with the evidence of negligible medium-run economic, health and educational impacts 18 months post-connection.
Yet, it is possible that these conclusions would change in settings with improved organizational performance by the electricity utility, or different levels of economic development. In table 5, we simulate the cost, consumer surplus, and net welfare per household using both the experimental approach presented in Section V.C and the alternative demand approach in Section V.E., under a range of assumptions about the underlying institutional and economic setting. In particular, we simulate the impact of "improving" the setting in five distinct ways: (a) allowing for household income growth of 3 percent per annum over 30 years (for the experimental approach) and electricity consumption growth of 10 percent per annum over 30 years (for the alternative approach); (b) alleviating credit constraints for grid connections; (c) eliminating transformer breakdowns; (d) eliminating the grid connection delays households face;
and (e) eliminating all project construction cost leakage. 49 We examine these individually, and then assess the effect on consumer surplus of combining them all in what we call the "ideal scenario", which can be thought of as perhaps the best-case scenario for a low-income country considering mass rural residential electrification.
The first row of table 5 presents the base results from the above analysis, including the average connection cost (at 100 percent coverage) of $658, average consumer surplus from the experimental approach of $147, and from the alternative approach of $147. As Kenya continues to develop, it is reasonable to assume that incomes and energy consumption will grow. To predict the effect of income growth on consumer surplus, we focus on the relative differences between households with low-and high-quality walls. For instance, the difference in experimental demand curves between these groups (figure 2, panel B) translates into a 2.2 percent annual growth rate of consumer surplus over ten years. Similarly, we estimate that the income difference between households with low-and high-quality walls translates into a 3 percent annual growth rate of income over ten years. 50 Extrapolating these relationships over a 30-year period, consumer surplus per household reaches $285, thus increasing by $139 (row a).
We further refine the estimates of consumer surplus in the experimental approach by relaxing credit constraints, using the valuations from the stated WTP question without time constraints described above (row b). 51 This more than triples consumer surplus, but is not enough to alter the conclusion that net welfare is likely to be negative. Similarly, while rapid electricity consumption growth in the coming 30 years (at 10 percent per year) leads to a large increase in consumer surplus in the alternative approach, it is not enough to offset the upfront cost (row a).
We next turn to simulated improvements in service provision that address transformer breakdowns (row c) and grid connection delays (row d), both of which somewhat increase consumer surplus, in the first case by increasing the number of days of service, and in the second case by assuming consumers get access to power sooner. As a rough approximation, we assume demand estimates scale linearly. Neither improvement on its own is sufficiently large enough to overturn the negative net welfare conclusion.
Finally, we simulate a reduction in total construction costs of 21.3 percent consistent with the degree of over-invoicing of construction poles documented in the data (row e). This leads to a sharp reduction in total costs under the assumption that this leakage is simply "waste"; leakage would far be less socially costly if viewed simply as a transfer from taxpayers to contractors (though would still incur some deadweight loss associated with the cost of raising funds). 50 As a proxy for the difference in income, we use food consumption per capita at endline. Note that we did not have a comprehensive measure of household income or consumption at baseline. Our baseline measure of monthly earnings-calculated as the sum of the respondent's profits from businesses and self-employment; salary and benefits from employment; and agricultural sales for the household-is imperfect as it excludes earnings from other household members as well as subsistence agriculture. 51 Note that the alternative approach reflects consumer surplus from a grid connection largely absent credit constraints since it presumes that the household already has a connection.
The bottom row presents the ideal scenario in which all improvements are simultaneously implemented. The use of the preferred experimental estimates incorporating the easing of credit constraints and future income growth results in a net welfare gain of $148. The alternative estimates using electricity consumption (and assuming rapid future consumption growth) are more negative, with a net welfare loss of $144. The bottom line is that, even under optimistic assumptions about the reduction of corruption and improvements in electricity service quality, together with sustained economic growth, mass rural residential electrification may or may not be an attractive public investment, and even if it is, the magnitude of any gains may not be large.
There may also be additional benefits that are not captured by household WTP that could make this calculation appear more positive. First, as outlined in Section II.B, there may be spillovers from private grid connections, including any benefits that local unconnected households experience. Yet as mentioned in Section V.A above, we find no evidence of an interaction between the treatment indicators and the local baseline electrification rate. 52 More importantly, there is no evidence of spillover impacts for local unconnected households along a range of economic, health and educational outcomes using endline survey data, as noted above.
Second, grid connections are long-lived but their long-term benefits may not be fully reflected in WTP if households have limited information about the future income or broader welfare benefits of electrification, or due to imperfect within-household altruism, for instance, if children stand to gain the most from indoor lighting in the evening (if it boosts learnings and future earning) but their parents do not fully understand these gains or incorporate them into decision-making. However, as noted above we do not find evidence for child test score gains in connected households in the medium-run.
Further, other factors may push up costs, making rural electrification less attractive. The per household connection cost would be substantially higher under a policy in which only a subset of households were connected to the grid (given the fixed costs of expanding the local low voltage network), rather than the mass connection case we assume in Table 5 . Most importantly, access to modern energy could generate negative environmental externalities from higher CO 2 emissions and other forms of pollution.
Moreover, we have considered neither the costs nor economic benefits of the initial investment to extend the high-voltage lines and install transformers in each sample community.
Each installation required a large investment-the median cost per transformer is $21,820 )-and the welfare gains from powering the targeted public facilities, while potentially large, have not been measured. Our analysis treats these costs as sunk and focuses solely on the economics of electrifying "under grid" households, conditional on existing infrastructure. This is the policy-relevant question in our setting, given the expanding Kenya LMCP, but the cost of transformer installations would need to be considered in many other African and Asian settings.
VII. CONCLUSION
Over the past century, rural electrification has served as a key benchmark for economic development and social progress. The United States began its mass rural electrification program in the late-1930s, though it required two decades to reach 90 percent of households (Kitchens and Fishback 2015) , China did so in the 1950's, and South Africa launched its initiative in the 1990s. Today, access to energy has emerged as a major political issue in many low-income countries, as they aim to repeat the successes of earlier mass electrification programs.
However, the extent to which increases in energy access should be driven by investments in large-scale infrastructure, such as grid connections, or small-scale decentralized solutions, such as solar lanterns and solar home systems, remains contested. Does Africa's energy future even lie with the grid? Although our findings suggest that household electrification may reduce social welfare, they do not necessarily imply that distributed solar systems are any more attractive than the grid, or that the patterns we identify are universal across time and space. In fact, the evidence-on inflated construction costs from leakage, and the pervasiveness of bureaucratic red tape, low grid reliability, and household credit constraints, all of which would suppress demand-suggests that the social welfare consequences of rural electrification are closely tied to organizational performance as well as institutions. We show that settings with better performance by the electricity utility-with fewer losses due to leakage and service that is more responsive to customers-may see shifts in both the cost curve and the demand side, and in such settings mass rural electrification may potentially be the socially optimal policy.
Another possibility is that mass electrification is indeed transformative and reshapes social, political, and economic interactions, perhaps in the long-run, but individual rural households do not internalize these benefits, and they are neither reflected in private demand estimates nor observable in the medium-run follow-up data collected 18 months post-connection.
Rural Kenyan households today may on average be too poor to consume meaningful amounts of electricity, but perhaps after another decade (or two) of sustained income growth they will be able to purchase the complementary appliances needed to fully exploit electrification's promise.
Decisions to invest in large-scale energy infrastructure programs are associated with major opportunity costs and long-run consequences for future economic development and climate change, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, where access to electricity lags the rest of the world. The findings of this study indicate that connecting rural households today is not necessarily an economically productive and high return activity in the world's poorest countries.
The social returns to investments in transportation, education, health, water, sanitation, or other sectors-indeed possibly including the electrification of industrial sites or urban areas-need to be compared to investments in rural electricity grid expansion to determine the appropriate sequencing of major public investments. Given the high stakes around these decisions, and the limited evidence base, there is a need for research in several areas, including generating further evidence on the impacts of increasing the supply of electricity, both in terms of access and reliability, to different types of consumers, such as commercial and industrial consumers;
identifying the patterns and drivers of consumption demand, including for energy-efficient appliances; and determining routes to improving electric utility organizational performance. Notes: In panel A, the electric utility is a natural monopoly facing high fixed costs, decreasing marginal costs (MC A ), and decreasing average total costs (ATC A ). MC A intersects demand at d . At d , a government-subsidized mass electrification program would increase social welfare since consumer surplus (i.e., the area under the demand curve) is greater than total cost. Panel B illustrates an alternative scenario with higher fixed costs. In this case, consumer surplus is less than total cost at all quantities. A mass electrification program would not increase welfare unless there are, for instance, positive externalities from private grid connections. Panel C illustrates a scenario in which social demand (D ) is sufficiently high for the ideal outcome to be full coverage, subsidized by the government. Notes: Each point on the scatterplot represents the community-level, budgeted estimate of the average total cost per connection (ATC) at a specific level of community coverage. The light-grey curve is the fitted curve from the IV regression reported in appendix table A1B, column 3. The dark-grey curve corresponds to the predicted vaues from the nonlinear estimation of (1) whether the household would accept a hypothetical offer (i.e., at a randomly assigned price) to connect to the grid (long-dashed line, black squares); (2) whether the household would accept the same hypothetical offer if required to complete the payment in six weeks (long-dashed line, grey squares); (3) whether the household would accept a hypothetical credit offer, consisting of an upfront payment (ranging from $39.80 to $79.60), a monthly payment (ranging from $11.84 to $17.22), and a contract length (either 24 or 36 months) (shortdashed line, black circles); and (4) whether the household would accept the same hypothetical offer if required to complete the deposit payment in six weeks (short-dashed line, grey circles. For the hypothetical credit offers, we assume a discount rate of 15 percent and plot the net present value of the credit offer and the take-up result. Additional details are provided in appendix table B12. Notes: Columns 1 and 2 report sample means for households that were unconnected and connected at the time of the baseline survey. Column 3 reports p-value of the difference between the means. Basic political awareness indicator captures whether the household head was able to correctly identify the presidents of Tanzania, Uganda, and the United States. Monthly earnings (USD) includes the respondent's profits from businesses and self-employment, salary and benefits from employment, and agricultural sales for the entire household. In the 2013 census of all unconnected households, just 5 percent of rural households were connected to the grid. In our sample of respondents, we oversampled the number of connected households. Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator variable (multiplied by 100) for household take-up, with a mean of 21.6. Take-up in the control group is 1.3. Robust standard errors clustered at the community level in parentheses. Pre-specified household controls include the age of the household head, indicators for whether the household respondent attended secondary school, is a senior citizen, is not primarily a farmer, is employed, and has a bank account, an indicator for whether the household has high-quality walls, and the number of chickens (a measure of assets) owned by the household. Pre-specified community controls include indicators for the county, market status, whether the transformer was funded and installed early on (between 2008 and 2010), community electrification rate at baseline, and community population. Monthly earnings (USD) includes the respondent's profits from businesses and self-employment, salary and benefits from employment, and agricultural sales for the entire household.
Interacted variables in columns 7 and 8 are the proportion of neighbors (i.e., within 200 meters) connected to electricity and an indicator for whether any households in the community reported a recent blackout, respectively. Asterisks indicate coefficient statistical significance level (2-tailed): * P < 0.10; ** P < 0.05; *** P < 0.01. Notes: In panel A, we report treatment effects on ten pre-specified primary outcomes. Column 1 reports mean values for the control group, with standard deviations in brackets. Column 2 reports coefficients from separate ITT regressions in which the dependent variable (e.g., P1) is regressed on the high subsidy treatment indicator. The low and medium subsidy groups are excluded from these regressions. Sample sizes range from 1,397 to 1,461 for the P1 to P9 regressions and 960 for the P10 regression. Column 3 reports coefficients from separate TOT (IV) regressions in which household electrification status is instrumented with the three subsidy treatment indicators. Sample sizes range from 2,090 to 2,180 for the P1 to P9 regressions, and 1,432 for the P10 regression. All specifications include the relevant set of pre-specified household, student, and community covariates. Column 4 reports the FDR-adjusted q-values associated with the coefficient estimates in column 3. In panel B, we report mean treatment effects on outcomes grouped into an economic and non-economic index; these two groupings of outcomes were not pre-specified. Robust standard errors clustered at the community level in parentheses. Asterisks indicate coefficient statistical significance level (2-tailed): * P < 0.10; ** P < 0.05; *** P < 0.01. Notes: Estimates of consumer surplus based on monthly electricity consumption levels ranging from 5 kWh to 75 kWh, and consumer demand elasticities ranging from -0.15 to -0.45. Common assumptions include a discount rate of 15%, an asset life of 30 years, a price of $0.12 per kWh, linear demand, zero consumer surplus from electricity without a grid connection, and a 188 day delay before obtaining an electricity connection (as illustrated in appendix figure A1). The 40 kWh level in column 3 corresponds to median consumption level reported by connected households at baseline. See appendix table B7 for details on the benchmark electricity consumption levels. Reduce waiting period from 188 to 0 days (see appendix figure A1 ). Notes: Main estimates of C, CS, and NW correspond to figure 4, panel B (for the experimental approach), and table 4, column 1, row 3 (for the alternative approach). Appendix table B13 includes an additional row to account for the consumer surplus associated with baseline connected households.
